18 Apr 2025 6 min read

What does a historical and comparative approach tell us about democratic resilience to fascist threats?

Hi all,

Although there are many useful studies on the topic of democratic backsliding and creeping authoritarianism, I have found a recent analysis of democratic resilience to provide a particularly useful framework for thinking through America’s democratic (non-)resilience in this moment. Essentially, this study rather succinctly provides empirical support for several of the factors identified in the broader literature as meaningful predictors of democratic backsliding/resilience.

This study analyzed a global dataset spanning 1900 to 2019, during which time they identified 96 episodes of fascist/autocratic attempts to subvert a democracy. The authors add a useful update to previous studies by identifying and analyzing two stages when a country can stave off a fascist attempt to subvert their democracy. The first stage they refer to as onset resilience, which is when a democracy prevents an autocratization attempt from even taking root. When a country fails to rebuff this initial attempt to subvert its democracy (ie., onset resilience fails), these countries then enter a period of democratic breakdown. If, at this second stage, a country successfully halts and/or reverses a fascist takeover, that democracy avoids a full breakdown.

For those keeping score, writing in 2019, the study's authors had already concluded that American democracy had failed the test of onset resilience and had entered into a period of democratic breakdown. To the degree we are able to stall or reverse the ongoing fascist takeover will determine if the United States experiences a full democratic breakdown.

A bit of bad news on this front, among countries that failed to squash the onset of a fascist attack, less than a quarter were able to save their democracies from a full breakdown. “In short, once democracies begin autocratizing, their fatality rate is very high.” But, hey, that also means one-quarter were successful. (“So, you’re telling me there’s a chance.”) It’s time to put all that exceptionalism Americans love to delude ourselves with to the test!

So, what lessons can we take from this comparative framework, which may provide some basis for making predictions about how this might all play out in the United States?

In terms of onset resilience, the factors that are most strongly correlated with a country’s ability to squash a fascist attack at the outset are judicial constraints on the executive and democratic stock (which means the number of years a country has been a democracy). When a country fails to derail the onset of autocratization, the most significant factors in preventing a full breakdown of a democracy are also judicial constraints on the executive and democratic stock, but also the number of “neighboring” countries that are democratic. (In the case of the United States, in this study our neighbors are considered other Western democracies.)

Of interest, and perhaps a small silver lining for the congressional Democrats’ profound failure to meet this moment (with the exception of Booker, Sanders, Van Hollen, Warren, Murphy, Frost, AOC, Rasmin, Crockett, Swalwell, and a handful of others)—this study also showed that legislative constraints on the executive were not predictive of resisting the onset of a fascist attack nor preventing the full breakdown of a country’s democracy. In other words… Hey, maybe even if more of the Democratic Party had grown a spine, it would not have made all that much of a difference anyway?! Unfortunately for us, and the Democrats running for re-election in 2026, we may never know…

Two other quick takeaways from this study, which I will return to at a later point. The first is that a military coup attempt is the most significant predictor of a democracy’s demise, for both the onset and breakdown periods. And, second, GDP per capita is only weakly correlated with onset resilience but not for breakdown resilience.

Considering the number of our "neighbors" that are still functioning democracies, and the fact that we are among the oldest liberal democracies in the world, the United States scores pretty well along these dimensions. However, the capacity for our judiciary to constrain the executive branch... well, that continues to be the biggest question mark. In future posts, I will expand further on what these factors suggest about the U.S.’s chances of preventing a full democratic breakdown, as well as the degree to which we should see cause for alarm… and, I promise, even optimism.

However, another advantage of a comparative approach is that it also enables us to identify the ways in which the current case of American democratic backsliding may differ from the other 95 cases—providing an additional angle to help illuminate how the United States may weather the current assault on our democracy. A few of the distinguishing factors that that stand out to me as particularly relevant in trying to understand how we got here and where this will all possibly lead, which I will explore in the next few emails, include:

America's federalist system and the complexity and size of the U.S. federal and state court systems.
America’s geographic size and diversity of population.
DOGE and the administration’s fast and frenzied dismantling of governmental institutions and services
America’s geopolitical role in the world and global economy (at least, up until now).
Musk.
The tech oligarchy.
Russia.

A quick note before leaving...

In light of the critical role played by judicial constraints on the executive in preventing a full democratic backdown, I would be remiss if I did not speak to the extraordinarily fraught moment this country faces at this very point in time. It has been clear for some time now that this showdown was destined. But, with the Trump administration making it increasingly clear that they will engage in whatever chicanery they can to not comply with the Supreme Court's decision that they must facilitate the return of Kilmar Abrego Garcia. And, with this case, as well as the case over the administration's defiance of a court order to return Venezuelan migrants en route to a Salvadoran gulag, heading toward contempt proceedings, we are now entering perhaps the most pivotal phase of our current constitutional crisis–the question of enforcement.

If the Trump administration continues to defy court rulings, who is going to take the necessary next steps to hold them in contempt? Moreover, what sort of actions might the Trump administration undertake should there be an attempt to hold them in contempt? How this plays out will be consequential for our capacity to avert a full democratic breakdown.

In addition to the fact that, should the Trump administration successfully subvert the will of the Supreme Court without consequence, by definition this would be the undoing of our constitutional democracy. I also think it is instructive to highlight the common theme that these two court cases share–the federal government's assertion that, without due process nor even evidence of wrong-doing, it is within their power to snatch people off the street and ship them off to foreign prison camps. As made evident by Trump's hot mic exchange with El Salvador's President Bukele, the plan has never been to stop with immigrants or legal residents; their ultimate goal is to exercise this power over every and any American citizen.

This is a critical component of the Trump administration's ability to continue to wield power over the coming months and years. As a U.S. political figure, Trump has distinguished himself by his willingness to flagrantly threaten and stoke political violence. It is a foundational part of what has enabled him to get thus far–starting with his violent rhetoric-filled rallies during his 2016 campaign, his threats against opponents and the news media, and unleashing his MAGA trolls to cow critics, opponents, and especially members of this own party into compliance for fear of their inboxes being filled with death threats or worse.

However, as the consequences of the wrecking ball his administration has taken to the U.S. economy and public services grow more stark, a disproportionate amount of this devastation will directly affect communities that have been reliably pro-Trump/GOP-supporters, whose blind and zealous fealty is a large source of Trump’s power to dominate and intimidate elected officials. As angry Americans increasingly take to the streets in massive numbers to express their disapproval. As law firms, universities, and other powerful societal organizations increasingly band together proactively in common defense. And, as Trump's declining polling numbers may finally embolden members of his own party to begin to push back on some of the more damaging elements of his reign. Trump will need, more than ever, the ability to threaten would-be critics, protestors, and opponents with political violence if he hopes to continue to wield any sort of meaningful power. And, this is precisely what being able to snatch anyone, for any reason, off the streets and then banish them to a foreign gulag, without recourse or due process, would afford him.

For these reasons, how this all develops over the next few weeks will likely tell us a lot about just how bad this is all going to get and for how long.